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I do not think so. My proposals would put in place a heavily safeguarded and transparent process whereby the individual who makes the request would be supported to understand the available options and in which medics would identify where there are needs and where those needs are not being met. All of that would happen in a way that is simply not the case at the moment, when those individuals are being left entirely to their own devices, often alone, and are making horrendous choices and decisions for themselves that not only further traumatise them but, as we know, traumatise those whom they ultimately leave behind. There are certainly gaps in palliative care, mental health and broader health and care services.

As I said, the proposals will put in place a robustly safeguarded process that means that anybody who comes forward to make the request has the reassurance of knowing that the wider context for the choice that they are seeking to exercise has been tested to the nth degree. That can therefore bring a degree of further reassurance and safeguarding to things that are happening at the moment. Decisions on matters such as double effect, palliative sedation and all the rest of it are being taken by medics, sometimes placing them in an invidious position, often without the input of the patient and sometimes without even the input of family members. There is an opportunity here to provide not just a robust safeguard but a degree of transparency that will be to the benefit of patients, but also to the benefit of medical practitioners.

I invite Dr Ward to add to that.

As you have described, it would be my expectation that the clause would apply to the people who are directly involved in the process, which I think is a proportionate approach to conscientious objection. A degree of caution needs to be exercised when drawing parallels between the process that is described here and abortion legislation. I think that the way in which the conscientious objection clause works is appropriate in the context of assisted dying.

Other people might be, at some stage, removed from the process. One of the examples that was given to me was of people in a hospital or a hospice setting who are aware that colleagues are, through the proposals in my bill, engaged in assisting somebody at the end of life, and might have an objection to that.

Extending that conscientious objection too extensively is problematic. It is about choice for those who are actively participating in the process. Extending it more widely runs the risk of putting up unnecessary and unjustified barriers to individual patients who meet all the eligibility criteria by denying them access to that choice.

That issue has been a really interesting element of the debate. As you will be aware, I have opted to place this very much within the framework of health and care services, because I think that that would be the most effective way of ensuring safeguards and a more effective and efficient way of delivering the service. The pathway for the patient needs to be as seamless as possible, with an assisted death being one of a series of end-of-life options.

One of the safeguards that is built into the process is the discussion that needs to take place between the co-ordinating physician and the patient to ensure that the patient is aware of all the options that are available—palliative care, social care or other types of health and care treatments—so that the decision is informed.

Things may change over time—as the committee has heard, prognoses are highly problematic, and more so in relation to some conditions than others. That is one of the reasons why I have not set a six-month timeframe, which is a feature in other jurisdictions. Things may change over time, and there may be an on-going conversation, but I think that it is safest for all concerned if this is embedded in the health and care service.

I find the idea of a stand-alone service problematic. Expecting somebody to be lifted and shifted out of a current pathway into another service at what is probably one of the most vulnerable points of their life—their final days—does not seem acceptable. I am perhaps more sympathetic to the notion of opt-in and opt-out, but I would need to understand how that would work in practice and how to avoid creating unnecessary obstacles to people accessing the option.

As for the numbers involved, the appropriate training would need to be given to people to carry out the work. As we see from other jurisdictions—I refer to evidence that I gave to the Finance and Public Administration Committee—the number of registered medics is around 400 in Victoria and Queensland. The number of people in Victoria who were actively involved in 2023-24 was around 300; in Queensland, the figure was around half that—about 120. The numbers are not terribly high.

There would be a wider expectation that training would be required of those who might not be as directly involved, but who would need to be aware of what the law is and of how they might signpost somebody who asked them for advice. Indeed, some people might want to do the training for their own peace of mind, so that they understand the legal provisions. There is a training requirement, but the number of patients involved is likely to be very small, certainly in the first couple of years; it will gradually increase as public awareness increases, as medic confidence increases and as medics get the training that they need in order to deliver the option.

I do not see any reason why, in Scotland, we would find difficulties with our capacity to deliver this option that have not been experienced in any of the other jurisdictions concerned, including those in Australia, New Zealand and the US, which operate a similar model.

As you will be aware, the schedules to the bill are effectively the forms for this and other aspects of the reporting requirements. It is important that death certificates reflect the underlying progressive advanced terminal illness that gave rise to the application, as well as the fact that medication had been administered to allow for an assisted death. For clarity and transparency, both those things need to be captured, which is what the schedules to the bill set out.

From my initial discussions with the chief medical officer, I recognise the legitimate concern that there may be some sensitivity about the way in which the information is expressed and the distinction between suicide and assisted dying, which goes back to an earlier point. The chief medical officer and his colleagues helpfully suggested that codes are used for registrations that may allow for that information to be captured in a way that respects and acknowledges the sensitivity of what we are discussing.

I am keen to explore that further, but it is important that we understand who is accessing the option of assisted death, what conditions are involved, when people are accessing it and their sociodemographic characteristics. We need as much information as possible—anonymised, of course. As we might touch on later, it will be crucial to report on and understand the picture of how the legislation is working in practice. There are the annual reports, which will feed into the five-year review that is also set out in the bill.

If we look at other jurisdictions, we see that there are a lot of similarities in who is accessing assisted dying, the reasons why they are doing so and the demographic profile, but to my mind it is absolutely essential that we gather information in Scotland. In fact, the only element of my proposals that changed between the initial consultation and when I brought the bill to Parliament was in respect of tightening up the data-reporting requirements that were envisaged. For public confidence, and for the confidence of patients and medics, the more robust those requirements are, the better.

In relation to interaction with UK responsibilities, the other matter, which gains less attention than the medication, is that of the regulation of professional bodies. However, similarly, that would need to be addressed in order for the fully functioning process of assisted dying to be put in place. That is not to say that the bill as it stands is not competent or that it cannot go through the full scrutiny process and be passed by the Parliament.

I can understand why the committee, ���˿���, the wider public, and those with an interest in the matter are keen to have a clear understanding of how the powers are to be exercised. That would give us confidence as to how the bill would work in practice. I do not know whether Dr Ward wants to add anything on the specifics of the regulation of professional bodies.

As I say, “ordinarily resident” is a legal concept that is understood. I noted the concerns that Police Scotland raised. I would be interested to know whether Police Scotland feels that there is an alternative definition that would address its concerns. The concept is fairly well established, and I do not know whether there is a way of defining it in the bill any differently from what is set out in the explanatory notes and policy memorandum, which I think make the policy intent clear.

That is another area where I would be happy to reflect on any proposed changes. However, the fact that the “ordinarily resident” requirement sits alongside a requirement for people to be registered with a GP probably gets around the concerns.

I understand where Police Scotland is coming from because it engages more often with the criminal law, and perhaps that is where some confusion arises, but I am fairly comfortable that that concern has not been raised by others and that the concept is pretty well established and understood.

I do not think so. My proposals would put in place a heavily safeguarded and transparent process whereby the individual who makes the request would be supported to understand the available options and in which medics would identify where there are needs and where those needs are not being met. All of that would happen in a way that is simply not the case at the moment, when those individuals are being left entirely to their own devices, often alone, and are making horrendous choices and decisions for themselves that not only further traumatise them but, as we know, traumatise those whom they ultimately leave behind. There are certainly gaps in palliative care, mental health and broader health and care services.

As I said, the proposals will put in place a robustly safeguarded process that means that anybody who comes forward to make the request has the reassurance of knowing that the wider context for the choice that they are seeking to exercise has been tested to the nth degree. That can therefore bring a degree of further reassurance and safeguarding to things that are happening at the moment. Decisions on matters such as double effect, palliative sedation and all the rest of it are being taken by medics, sometimes placing them in an invidious position, often without the input of the patient and sometimes without even the input of family members. There is an opportunity here to provide not just a robust safeguard but a degree of transparency that will be to the benefit of patients, but also to the benefit of medical practitioners.

I invite Dr Ward to add to that.

As you have described, it would be my expectation that the clause would apply to the people who are directly involved in the process, which I think is a proportionate approach to conscientious objection. A degree of caution needs to be exercised when drawing parallels between the process that is described here and abortion legislation. I think that the way in which the conscientious objection clause works is appropriate in the context of assisted dying.

Other people might be, at some stage, removed from the process. One of the examples that was given to me was of people in a hospital or a hospice setting who are aware that colleagues are, through the proposals in my bill, engaged in assisting somebody at the end of life, and might have an objection to that.

Extending that conscientious objection too extensively is problematic. It is about choice for those who are actively participating in the process. Extending it more widely runs the risk of putting up unnecessary and unjustified barriers to individual patients who meet all the eligibility criteria by denying them access to that choice.

The bill and the supporting documents are clear that the process is initiated by a request on the part of the patient for an assisted death, at which point the requirement is for the co-ordinated medical professionals to ensure that they understand the rationale for arriving at that decision, and equally to ensure that the individual is aware of all the treatment and care options that are available.

Listening to the evidence that the committee has heard in recent weeks, I recognise that, as much as one would like definitive clarity, proscribing or prescribing what a medical professional can and cannot discuss with their patient is territory into which we, as parliamentarians, probably need to tread very carefully. The expectation is that the process is initiated by the patient making the request, and thereafter the process and the safeguards that we have taken the time to discuss this morning would kick in.

I will bring Dr Ward in on that. Having a mental disorder does not preclude someone from accessing the option that would be available under my proposals. A capacity assessment would still need to be undertaken in the context of the decision around an assisted death. Appropriate supports could be put in place to ensure that the individual’s capacity was realised, but with some conditions, it might be felt that a mental disorder impacts on the capacity to make a choice about assisted death. In those instances, the person would not meet the eligibility criteria.