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I would like to see why on earth it would cost that amount of money to do something that is relatively simple, given the relative scale of the accreditation function in the SQA.

I will continue. I appreciate and am always open to interventions, but it is important that we get back to the central point that my amendment and the other amendments in the group are trying to address, which is how having the critical function of accreditation in the same organisation that is responsible for creating and delivering the qualifications creates a systemic risk of vulnerability that no amount of internal governance can correct.

I turn to the broader framework of the amendments in the group that I have put my name to in support—mainly the ones from Willie Rennie that give full effect to the reform. Amendments 115 and 116, in the name of Willie Rennie, begin the task of removing the accreditation committee from the internal machinery of qualifications Scotland. Amendment 116 in particular strikes key lines from schedule 1 that define the committee as subordinate to qualifications Scotland. That is the model which Professor Muir found deeply unsatisfactory. He said that the bill appears to allow the new body to have total control over when and if it needs to engage with wider users and who it engages with. That is a deeply troubling formulation.

As it stands, the legislation will enable the new agency to gatekeep engagement and control its own scrutiny mechanisms, which is precisely the culture of self-regulation that brought the SQA into disrepute. Amendments 115 and 116 begin the necessary process of dismantling that.

Amendments 117 and 219 are direct alternatives, with amendment 117, which I support, assigning the accreditation function to the chief inspector, and amendment 219 suggesting the SCQF Partnership as an alternative. Although the SCQF Partnership has strong expertise in qualification, comparability and recognition, it is not structured or equipped as a regulatory body. The SPICe analysis concludes that the SCQF would require significant expansion and restructuring to take on that function. Even then, concerns would remain about its legal authority and capacity to enforce accreditation standards. That is why I support the idea that the accreditation function should be housed with the chief inspector, which is an independent statutory office with scrutiny powers and, if later amendments later are passed, it would be accountable to the Parliament. I believe that that is the natural home for the function and one that aligns with international examples.

In my discussions with other parliamentarians round this table, I have repeatedly made the point that one of the organisations in Scotland for which I have enormous respect is Audit Scotland. When Audit Scotland publishes its reports, every one of us—the Government and parliamentarians—sits up and takes notice, because of the esteem in which it is held and the respect and authority with which the Auditor General speaks. Adding to the responsibilities of the office of the chief inspector would add further authority, credibility, respect and esteem to the accreditation function.

Jackie Dunbar asked about other examples. In England, Ofqual was established, precisely to address the failings of the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, under which award and regulation were combined. Qualifications Wales operates entirely separately from Government or delivery agencies. In Northern Ireland, the Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment combines the two roles. Having listened to what school leaders and expert opinion reflect about Northern Ireland, I know that there is deep and widespread dissatisfaction with the way that things work there.

We should stick with the expert view. I do not think that there is any appetite for continuing or replicating the model in Northern Ireland and the one that we have here in Scotland when there is so much dissatisfaction with it. We should learn the lessons that are on offer to us and move on.

Would it not simply be a case of taking the existing allocation of resources in Education Scotland and moving it to somewhere else? That is not an increase; it is a simple transfer of resources.

The risk is that we have a bill that is supposed to address those fundamental issues in the Scottish education system, but that we do nothing about them. The risk is that we have another two or three years, or however long it is, of further consideration of detail, which I think was the phrase that the cabinet secretary used earlier. The fact is that we have been discussing this, in one shape or form or another, almost continuously for years already, and the evidence clearly suggests that separation is required.

I am also not entirely sure about the issue of cost. To be absolutely clear, I come from the background of the private sector, but I am not sure that I accept the argument that you create lots more costs simply by taking one set of resources and moving them, in reporting and accountability terms, to another body. I am not sure that I understand why, in the public sector, that would automatically create a massive increase in costs. The costs are already allocated; you are simply moving them to a different place, where they will operate separately and independently of the original host. I do not understand that argument. I would be very happy to hear an explanation, which is perhaps more granular than the convener will be prepared to allow here.

I can see that the convener is happy for there to be a granular discussion. I am happy for there to be a granular explanation as to why we suddenly have this enormous expansion of costs. As I said, I come at the issue from a different background of working in the private sector, where, if you decide to reallocate resources, it does not increase the resources; in fact, you are very strongly controlled in relation to not increasing the resources—you simply reallocate them. I do not understand what the granular argument for the increase in costs is.

I am willing to give way; I always give way to the cabinet secretary when she wishes to intervene.

Of course. I always give way to the cabinet secretary.

I am grateful to all who have contributed to the debate so far. I was at a bit of a loss when the cabinet secretary talked about the need for further time for more detailed consideration. There seems to have been an eternal consideration of detail, and that is what the bill was supposed to address. For the bill to say that, in effect, we are going to have an even more elongated period of further consideration seems quite ridiculous.

I am not entirely sure that I understand why the cabinet secretary is at pains to point out that the Muir report came before her time in office. I am happy to give way so that she can intervene and explain why, because it might be due to something very simple. However, I am not sure what I am to infer from what she has said. There have been repeated references to the fact that this happened before she was in office or that this was before her time. I hope that that is not some kind of diplomatic disowning of the Muir report.

Well, anyone listening is to be welcomed, cabinet secretary, so congratulations on having that particular learning skill.

Before I address the amendments, and specifically amendment 316, which is in my name, I will echo what Pam Duncan-Glancy said a few moments ago about the legislation team. The team has done a fantastic job of helping members—particularly me, frankly—to craft amendments out of a flow of unconscious or conscious consciousness, about how the bill might be improved, and there are many aspects of the bill that can be improved.

I will now address amendment 316 and speak to the full suite of amendments in group 2. I believe that it is important that we take time to debate the issue, and I am glad that we are doing so, because this is one of the most consequential debates that we will have at stage 2. The issue before us is not simply one of administrative structure or functional reallocation; it is about institutional credibility and public trust. Unless we properly and decisively reform the way that accreditation is handled in Scottish education, we will have failed to learn the lessons of the past, and we will have failed those who called for the bill in the first place.

As Willie Rennie rightly framed at the outset, at the heart of this group is the question of whether qualifications Scotland, the successor of the SQA, should be permitted to continue overseeing the accreditation of qualifications that it also awards. Currently, it is marking its own homework. The bill as introduced retains that dual function, albeit behind internal governance barriers. However, I say clearly that that is not sufficient, and that view reflects expert and stakeholder views.

We need a structure that does not see a repetition of the kind of reputational damage that the SQA has suffered, which happened, in large measure, because of that very structure, which enables a conflict of interest between the design and delivery of qualifications on the one hand and the quality assurance of those same qualifications on the other.

That was undeniably the view of Professor Ken Muir, whose report we all welcomed and which recommended putting learners at the centre. Included in that report were the following words:

“the accreditation functions of the SQA should be removed from the new qualifications body”,

to ensure greater independence. What that considerable, weighty and incredibly positive report, which we all welcomed, said was crystal clear.

You earlier alluded to the fact—I think that it is undeniable—that the cabinet secretary has shown no inclination to consider all the different options with an open mind. You mentioned her body language, which I thought was a bit cruel, as I think that the body language has been fine, cabinet secretary

I will come to what has happened elsewhere. I think that your chief comment is about whether my amendment would create a more weighty office for the chief inspector, and the answer is that it undoubtedly would, and I acknowledge that. Going back to what I said to John Mason, which Willie Rennie also said, there is no perfect solution, but we must achieve the separation of those functions through the bill. Having considered all the options and spoken to lots of people, as I am sure we all have done, I am proposing that that separation is best achieved by moving the accreditation function to the chief inspector’s office.

Returning to my amendment, my proposal does not arise in a vacuum. It directly follows from the conclusions of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s review “Scotland’s Curriculum for Excellence: Into the Future”, in which the OECD said:

“Scotland’s system is heavily governed relative to its scale and numbers of schools. The multiple layers of Governance ... can complicate implementation processes by generating additional policy priorities and supplementary materials with little co-ordination.”

In that context, the OECD specifically recommended that we should have a stand-alone agency that handles curriculum and assessment, with independent scrutiny being built into the design of new national institutions. That is largely where Ken Muir went as well.

The issue is not just conceptual or theoretical; it is deeply pragmatic and practical. The cabinet secretary has gone to great lengths to talk about costs and so on in her response to previous speakers. However, as the Scottish Parliament information centre briefing explains, the SQA’s accreditation work comprises only a small percentage of its operational activity. I think that the SPICe briefing suggests that it is £1 million out of a £107 million budget, yet it is that work that gives the system its integrity.

I will address amendment 221 in my name, along with amendments 222 and 223, which Ross Greer has already referenced. Together, they propose important refinements to the staffing provisions that relate to the new body, qualifications Scotland. To my mind, this group of amendments goes to the heart of how the agency will function in practice and its organisational culture.

I got a bit excited earlier about the importance of leadership, but I will probably get even more excited about the importance of culture. I think that the two go together and are symbiotic in many ways. I am familiar, as I am sure many other members are, with the concept that culture eats strategy for breakfast. The best-laid schemes and plans are all liable to perish when they come into contact with poor leadership and poor culture. My amendments are an attempt to address the issues of operational culture, internal ethos and, most important, the rights and duties of the individuals who will be employed and specifically charged with delivering reform. If we are serious about delivering structural and cultural reform, we must attend not only to who leads public bodies but to how staff are appointed, supported and held to proper standards of conduct and impartiality.

My amendments in this group seek to embed those principles more firmly in the legislation. I will unpack amendment 221, which says:

“Qualifications Scotland may only appoint a person as chief executive if Qualifications Scotland and the Scottish Ministers consider the person ... a fit and proper person”,

which speaks for itself, and if the person

“has experience of leadership”.

I expect any reading of that provision to suggest that the person has had successful experience of leadership, that they have led a progressive organisation, that they have seen change managed in a whole organisation, and that they have skills, knowledge and expertise in education.

Ross Greer and I are perhaps at opposite ends of this discussion, but an issue that is regularly raised with me by teachers and educationalists is that the people who are in charge of the significant institutions that define the Scottish educational landscape sometimes do not have a feel for education, because they do not have the experience of real-world contact that the people who are commenting to me have. That view has been raised with me by a number of people whom I consider to be experts.

The person appointed should have some

“skills, knowledge and expertise in ... the regulation of educational qualifications”.

They should have an understanding of that field of interest. They should also have operated in a public sector setting, because, as I alluded to, that can be quite a different environment for someone who has not had experience of public sector governance.

No—it is evidence. It is the evidence that is presented and available, as it would be in responding to any such situation. I would not expect anybody to respond to vagaries of opinion—I would expect such things to be substantiated by firm evidence. That is a requirement of sound leadership: that you gather evidence. That may involve different opinions, but you should be at the heart of seeking evidence, in whatever form you can get it, in order to be fair and transparent in the way that you arrive at your decisions.

Amendment 222 would also ensure that, under the chief executive’s leadership, qualifications Scotland would adhere to the Nolan principles—the seven principles of public life: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. Those are not, and should never be treated as, platitudes; they are the ethical framework by which all public servants in Scotland ought to be judged.

Again, the bill as introduced is largely silent on those matters. It creates a body, establishes a board and defines functions, but it says almost nothing about the internal responsibilities of those who will actually deliver on that body’s mission. I recognise that we cannot legislate for outcomes, but we can legislate for structures and expectations that make good outcomes more likely. That is why I offer these amendments, which seek to do just that.

I turn to amendment 223, to which Ross Greer referred in his remarks. The amendment proposes that the chief executive be appointed for a fixed and non-renewable term of seven years. Again, that is about protecting the independence of the role. If we are serious about having an inspectorate, or any chief executive or anybody in a high-profile public role, who can speak truth to power and who can challenge national policy and local practice, I feel that, in statute, we must insulate that role from the possibility that the independence of the chief executive might be compromised by considerations of future reappointment.

A non-renewable term would also remove the risk of perceived favour seeking, and it would liberate the postholder to lead fearlessly and impartially. Seven years seems to be a reasonable period.